به‌ڵگه‌ی‌ گرنگ له‌سه‌ر كوژرانی‌ سێ‌ ژنه‌ چالاكوانه‌ كورده‌كه‌

اسناد ویکیلیکس در باره حزب کارگران کردستان و توطئه بین المللی علیه این حزب اینجا 100% اثبات شد که رژیم ترکیه و دستگاه امنیتی موسوم به میت با همکاری چند کشور دیگر بین المللی سکینه جانسز و یارانش را تحت تعقیب قرار داده اند و از وضعیت موجود میان حزب کارگران کردستان و دولت ترکیه تحت نام گفتگو که یک توطئه بیش نیست سواستفاده نموده اند و توانسته اند دست به این جنایت بزنند علیه فرزندان ملت کرد من در یک اطلاعیه در این باره  به خیلی چیزهای کلیدی اشاره نموده ام و اسناد ویکیلیکس همه ابهامات درست شده از سویی  دراویش اخوان المسلمین و دار دستیهای اردوغان که میخواستند خبرها را وارونه کنند بعد از رسوایی عمل تروریستی در خاک فرانسه  و رسوا شدن در میان ملتهای اروپایی رژیم تروریستی  ترکیه باردگر نشانداد که چقدر وجود این رژیم برای اتحادیه اروپا خطرناک است و یکی از کثیفترین رژیمهای میباشد که بنیاد این رژیم بر اساس نژادپرستی بناه شده است از قتلعام ارامنه و سریانیها و آشوریها بگیر تا قتلعام کردها و قتلعام ملت قبرص  یگ لکی سیاهیی است بر پیشانی رژیم تروریستی ترکیه

ما این ترور را قویا محکوم میکنیم  با سپاس ساموئیل کرماشانی 

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07ANKARA2917.html

به‌ڵگه‌ی‌ گرنگ له‌سه‌ر كوژرانی‌ سێ‌ ژنه‌ چالاكوانه‌ كورده‌كه‌

بەڵگەنامەی ویکیلیکس هەموو ئەو پرۆپاگەندانی وا باسیی لیۆە دەکرا هەر هەموویان درۆ بووەن ئیستا سەد لە سەدا دەرکەوت کە دەولەتی تێرۆریستی تورک ئەو ٣ ژنە چالاکوانی کوردی لە وەلاتی فەرنسا تێرۆر کردوە 

جا دوابەدوایی ریسۆابوونی دەولەتی تێرۆریستی تورک  میدیاکانی سەر بە ئەو رژیمە هەولیان دا کە هەوالەکە  بۆ رایی گەشتی چەواشە بەکەن  رژەیک بەلێن ئیران دەستی لە ئەم تێرۆردا هەبووە رۆژەیکی دیکەیش  وەتیان سوریا  لە ئەولێن رۆژیی روداوەکە ئێمە وەک رۆژنامە نوسیکی سەربەخوو ئەو هەوالانم رەت کردوتەوە چونکە بەڵگەنامەکانی ویکیلیکس هیچ  چەتیکی نەهیشتوتەوە کە خەلکی کوردستان گومانیان لە وەلاتیکی دیکە بێت بەلکۆ رژیمی تورکیا خۆیی دەستی لە خۆینی ٣ چالاکوانی کورد دا رەنگێن بووە و دەزگای هەوالگری تورک دەستی لە ئەم تێرۆردا هییە

ئێمە بە تووندی ئەم تێرۆرە شەرمەزار دەکەێن و داوا لە والتی فەرنسا دەکەێن کە دیپلوماتە تێرۆریستەکانی تورکیای تێرۆریست لە وەلاتەکی دەربەکات لە گەل ریزمدا سامۆئیل کرماشانی 

Viewing cable 07ANKARA2917, BLOCKING MONEY FLOWS TO THE PKK IN NORTHERN IRAQ:

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07ANKARA2917.html

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs 

Reference ID Created Classification Origin

07ANKARA2917 2007-12-07 14:48 SECRET Embassy Ankara

VZCZCXRO6474

PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHROV

DE RUEHAK #2917/01 3411448

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 071448Z DEC 07

FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4583

INFO RUCNMUC/EU CANDIDATE STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002917 

 

SIPDIS 

 

SIPDIS 

 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2027 

TAGS: KTFN EFIN PTER PREL TU IZ

SUBJECT: BLOCKING MONEY FLOWS TO THE PKK IN NORTHERN IRAQ: 

EXPANDING OUR STRATEGY 

 

REF: A. STATE 134271 

     ¶B. BAGHDAD 3934 

     ¶C. BAGHDAD 3808 

     ¶D. ANKARA 661 

     ¶E. 2006 ANKARA 4450 

     ¶F. 2006 ANKARA 4290 

 

Classified By: Ambassador Ross Wilson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 

 

¶1. (S) Summary.  As the United States works together with 

Turkey to implement the President's directive for effective 

action against PKK terror, we must also redouble our efforts 

to shut down the financial support that flows from Europe 

into PKK headquarters located in northern Iraq.  While 

previous work, primarily in the form of demarches to European 

governments, has shown some limited progress, the overall 

credibility of this effort was badly undermined by the recent 

release in Vienna of PKK financier Riza Altun by Austrian 

authorities.  To overcome these setbacks and register 

tangible progress in the near and medium term, the USG will 

need to work intensively on three simultaneous efforts: 

 

-- First, we need to identify and interdict PKK money that is 

flowing into northern Iraq.  This will require U.S., Iraqi, 

and European authorities to collaborate in a targeted effort 

that includes enhanced airport screening, more extensive 

customs procedures, and aggressive disruption of illicit cash 

transfers into northern Iraq and between northern Iraqi 

entities and PKK terrorists. 

 

-- Second, we will push the Turks to work more effectively to 

identify and interdict financial flows.  MASAK, Turkey's 

Financial Crimes Investigation Board, is the GOT's sole money 

laundering and terrorist financing investigative body.  It 

needs to streamline its investigations and work more 

effectively with financial police, prosecutors, and judges to 

effectuate successful prosecutions. 

 

-- Third, we should more sharply focus our work with the 

Europeans.  Previous demarches sensitized the EU to PKK 

criminal activities.  Now we need to narrow our focus by 

identifying and going after the two top targets of Riza Altun 

and Sakine Cansiz.  Given their previous arrests, cases 

against them have been started.  We can help by providing the 

most extensive dossiers possible and coordinating with law 

enforcement and intelligence counterparts in Europe to ensure 

these two terrorists are incarcerated.  End Summary. 

 

---------- 

Background 

---------- 

 

¶2. (S) The PKK raises upwards of USD 50-100 million annually 

through fundraising activities to sustain operations in 

Turkey and northern Iraq.  Sensitive reporting shows the top 

four countries for fundraising are Germany, France, 

Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  Other regions important 

to PKK/KGK fundraising include Austria, the Balkans, Belgium, 

and the Netherlands.  Sensitive reporting has identified PKK 

fundraising leaders in Europe, but we have limited actionable 

intelligence on how the money flows to the PKK.  Available 

reporting indicates the use of hawala networks (informal 

multi-country remittance system), cash couriers, narcotics, 

and gold to move money. 

 

¶3. (S) Funding of PKK activities is done through a wide 

variety of methods.  These include fundraising, cultural, 

social, and sporting event sponsorship, membership fees, and 

commercial business ventures.  PKK financiers also traffic in 

narcotics, smuggle both people and goods, and charge 

extortion and protection fees.  While the latter activities 

can be prosecuted as criminal offenses, the former activities 

can only be prosecuted under terror finance laws when clear 

ties to PKK activities can be proven. 

 

--------------------------- 

Legwork is Already Underway 

--------------------------- 

 

¶4. (S) Over the last year, S/CT has been active in driving 

political-level demarches to all European capitals on 

terrorist financing.  S/CT Deputy Counterterrorism 

Coordinator Frank Urbancic has traveled widely in Europe to 

raise awareness and to bring together prosecutors, judges, 

financial police, financial intelligence unit personnel, and 

Justice and Interior Ministry officials to discuss ways to 

investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist 

finance cases related to the PKK.  The Regional Legal Advisor 

has hosted workshops for relevant officials in Turkey and 

arranged meetings and seminars for European and Turkish 

 

ANKARA 00002917  002 OF 002 

 

 

counterparts to facilitate a task-force mentality to work 

together to fight the PKK.  At the November U.S./EU Troika on 

Terrorist Financing, the new EU Terrorism Czar appeared 

committed to ensuring EU cooperation.  Turkey has recently 

finalized a terrorism extradition with Switzerland (on hold 

pending an administrative hearing) and last week two PKK 

members were successfully extradited to Turkey from Germany. 

Pressure should be maintained on all EU member states to 

prosecute or extradite. 

 

------------------- 

Three-Part Strategy 

------------------- 

------------------- 

Working with Europe 

------------------- 

 

¶5. (S) As we have learned from efforts to shut down al-Qaeda 

financing since September 11, joint law enforcement and 

intelligence sharing is essential.  Numerous European 

countries have asked for our assistance in providing 

actionable intelligence, and S/CT continues to work on this 

issue.  Continued networking with prosecutors and 

investigative judges is paramount.  Investigative judges 

carry out the investigations and direct law enforcement in 

Europe. 

 

¶6. (S) Our immediate goal is to deny the PKK use of the 

European financial and air transport systems to move money 

from Europe into northern Iraq for their operations.  We can 

accomplish this via enhanced intelligence sharing, more 

careful airport screening and strict enforcement of cash 

declaration requirements.  We also should press the Europeans 

to take action against the two most notorious PKK/KGK 

financiers in Europe, Riza Altun and Sakine Cansiz.  Riza 

Altun is known to be a top PKK financier.  He fled judicial 

arrest in France in July and Austrian authorities allowed him 

to fly to Iraq on July 13, but he recently has been seen 

traveling again in Europe.  Sakine Cansiz is a PKK/KGK 

financier and weapons and tactical strategist.  She was 

arrested in Germany but released by a Hamburg court on April 

27 after 40 days of detention and remains in Europe.  Their 

re-arrest and prosecution would limit PKK/KGK activities and 

signal that Europe is not a free zone for PKK/KGK 

fundraising. 

 

----------------- 

Working with Iraq 

----------------- 

 

¶7. (S) Inside Iraq, as reported ref B, we face a cash economy 

that will make disrupting money flows inside Iraq difficult. 

The upcoming S/CT-led assessment team to Erbil should provide 

recommendations on the most effective ways to stop money 

flowing to the PKK once it reaches Iraq.  The apparent lack 

of legal authority for the government to seize assets prior 

to conviction might be a major roadblock.  Sensitive 

reporting indicates that the KRG has infiltrated the PKK in 

northern Iraq.  If so, we should press the KRG to help 

identify illicit money flows so we can interdict them before 

they reach the PKK. 

 

------------------- 

Working with Turkey 

------------------- 

 

¶8. (S) The PKK also raises money in Turkey.  The Turkish 

financial intelligence unit (MASAK) lacks the technical and 

analytical capability to identify or interdict terrorism 

finance activity.  Post will continue its efforts to get 

Turkish law enforcement and intelligence agencies to share 

information and cooperate to make interdiction possible.  We 

also need to ensure that if we get Europeans to clamp down on 

cash couriers and transfers, Turkey similarly needs to make 

undeclared bulk cash transfers illegal, seize bulk cash 

assets, and identify cash transfers through the banking 

system that are headed to the PKK. 

 

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 

 

WILSON